Abstract-Location Based Service (LBS) is gaining popularity. As one fundamental LBS service, range search returns all Point of Interests (POIs) within a user-specified range. However, people also leave their location privacy at risks when using range search. How to provide a high-quality range search service while protecting users' location privacy is a challenging problem. Most existing approaches use space-filling curves and cloaked region method to provide privacy-preservation location services, but these methods cannot return the accurate results. In this paper, we propose a set of Circular Shifting Encryption Protocols (CSEP) based on homomorphism and circular shift for location privacy protection of range search. CSEP leverages homomorphic encryption to encrypt users' locations, and LBS servers compute distances on cyphertext. In this way, LBS server can return POIs within the specified range, while learning nothing about the user's real location. To accommodate the different query range and the private protection degree of users, we propose a circular shifting encryption method to reduce the redundancy and increase the degree of privacy protection. We implement a prototype of CSEP, and evaluate it with real POI set of a large-scale production LBS. Experimental results show that CSEP can provide reliable privacy protection and accurate range search, with reasonable compute overhead and communication overhead. (Abstract)
I. INTRODUCTION
With the widespread use of mobile devices and GPS navigation, Location Based Services (LBS) are becoming indispensable in our daily life. Users can enjoy the convenience provided by LBS by submitting LBS queries. However, as the information about users accumulated on the untrusted LBS servers, user's location information is at risks. Once leaked, the location data could reveal sensitive information of users, such as where they are at which time, what kind of queries they submit, what they are doing, etc. [1] Thus, high attention should be paid to the location privacy issue.
Nearest neighbor search is one of the most basic services in LBS, and is the basis for other services such as route planning, proximate friends finding and so on. Range search is one of the most important modes of nearest neighbor search, which need to return very accurate results. The problem we are considering is to provide a reliable location privacy preserving range search method that guarantees accurate results.
In recent years, many approaches have been proposed. (1) Most existing approaches use spatial cloaking to hide the real location of a user [2] [3] [4] [5] . In these approaches, an anonymization server transforms the location of a user to a cloaked region, and sends this region to the LBS server. Then, the LBS server returns all POIs within the proximity of the cloaked region. However, as the LBS does not know the exact location of the user, it cannot return the exact POIs within say r meters from the user. (2) Space transformation method [6] [7] converts the location information into another space representation, which has a certain transformation relationship with the original one, such as Hilbert space filling curve [6] and Moore curve [7] . However, these space-filling curve methods cannot return the exact nearest neighbors and the result may generate serious deviation in some cases. (3) Cryptographic transformation [6] [8] methods provide privacy preserving by encryption, which can provide higher degree of location privacy protection, but needs client to take part in the encrypted distance computing and cannot support multiple neighbors query.
In this paper, we propose Circular Shifting Encryption Protocols (CSEP) for location privacy preserving, which do not need a third-party server. CSEP leverages the spatial cloaking technique and complements it with encryption method for improving precision. There is no third party in CSEP and we do not trust LBS server. To provide different privacy protection level, two protocols are designed in CSEP. Protocol 1 uses spatial cloaking method to hide user's exact location. Moreover, homomorphic encryption is used during the interaction process in Protocol1 to avoid monitoring from adversaries. Protocol 2 is proposed based on Protocol1 to provide higher degree of privacy protection. Protocol 2 leverages circular shifting encryption for POIs in query results and corresponding POI information in LBS server. Thus Protocol 2 decreases the redundancy of POI information during transmission, and provides higher privacy protection degree as well.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We propose CSEP, a set of Circular Shifting Encryption Protocols to achieve reliable location privacy preserving mechanism based on spatial cloaking and homomorphic encryption.
• We implement a prototype of CSEP, and evaluate it using real POI dataset from the aspects of results accuracy, compute overhead and communication overhead etc. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces some technical background of this paper. Section III introduces the main idea of CSEP and related definitions. Section IV presents the design of two protocols in CSEP. Section V evaluates CSEP with experiments and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
This section first introduces a grid geospatial representation used in CSEP. Then introduces Paillier homomorphic encryption for encryption distance calculation and circular shifting.
A. Geospatial representation
In this paper, we adopt the traditional grid geospatial representation: Consider a two-dimensional geographic region, we split the region with 1 meter as a unit by latitude and longitude direction, respectively. We define the square grid unit with latitude index Hi and longitude index Vj as <Hi, Vj> cell.
A POI can be represented by <POIID, H, V, POITYPE, POIINFO>. Among them, POIID is the index that can uniquely identify the POI. H is the latitude value, V is the longitude value. POITYPE is the type information of the POI (e.g. hotel, scenic site, petrol filling station, shopping mall). POIINFO is the associated POI information This fine-grained partitioning method can identify POIs accurately, thus can complete the geospatial calculation with high precision.
B. Paillier homomorphicencryption
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) allows direct addition and multiplication on cyphertexts while preserving decryptability. We choose Paillier's system [9] to provide homomorphic encryption of user's location which is simple and efficient. Paillier's cryptosystem is composed of three algorithms KeyGenerate, Encrypt and Decrypt. The Paillier's cryptosystem satisfies the following homomorphic properties:
For the sake of simplicity, we use E(m) instead of E(m,r) in the remaining paper.
Before the implementation of CSEP, we generated encryption key EKu = (n,g) and decryption key DKu =( , ) for Paillier's cryptosystem on the client side. The corresponding public key EKs and private key DKs are generated and assigned to the server by a certain public key cipher system.
III. CSEP: MAIN IDEA AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we introduce the main idea of CSEP and definitions. CSEP is a location preserving method using a circular shifting encryption method. There are two protocols in CSEP. Protocol1 combines spatial cloaking and homomorphism encryption to provide reliable location privacy protection. Protocol2, which provides higher degree of privacy protection, uses a circular shifting encryption method to reduce the redundancy of POI information by offsetting the POIID of the POI set and corresponding POIINFO on the server side.
A. Main Idea of CSEP
CSEP consists of the client side U and the server side S, assuming the following conditions: 1) U is credible. It will not disclose user's location, its decryption key and other relevant information initiatively; U has general computing ability to complete encryption, decryption and other tasks.
2) S is not completely trustworthy. S has a strong computing ability, to complete database retrieval, homomorphic encryption and other tasks. The POI-table, which stores POI information, is maintained in S and contains 5 attributes: <POIID, H, V, POITYPE, POIINFO>, the meaning of each attribute is described in Section 2.1.
3) Both U and S will follow the protocols.
The main idea of CSEP is based on spatial cloaking method, as shown in Fig.1 . Suppose that user U takes the query point Q (HQ, VQ) as the center, and queries all the POIs of type t in the range of r meters. First, U specifies a set of parameters to generate cloaked region rectangle R2 randomly. Secondly, S selects all the POIs that satisfy the query requirements according to the cloaked region R2, calculates distances between POIs in the candidate POI and query point Q using homomorphism encryption (on cyphertext), and sends the encrypted distances and corresponding POI information to U. Finally, U decrypts the cyphertext and filters the POIs that meet the requirement.
In order to control the overhead of CSEP better, and meet the different privacy protection requirements of users, CSEP provides an enhanced protocol. In the enhanced protocol, indexes of POI result set calculated in the client side and POI table maintained in the server side are shifted, and the server S can return all the POI information of the POIs that meet the restriction, without knowing the result POI set. Query location and POI information of the user will be better protected on the client side using a circular shifting method, and the transfer redundancy will be reduced as well. 
IV. CSEP: DETAILED DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS
In this section, we introduce the detailed design of two protocols of CSEP. The detailed steps are as follows:
Protocol 1 is a baseline protocol as a building block for Protocol 2. The client-server interaction flow of Protocol1 is shown in Fig.2 . The detailed steps are as follows:
Client Server
Boundary of R 2 , Encrypted query point information, Queried POI type
perform secret distance calculation P e r f o r m de cryption to o b t a i n t h e r e s u l t o f t h e r a n g e s e a r c h q u e r y f r o m Candidate_POI According to the privacy protection requirements and the query range r, the client U randomly determines H4-H3 and V4-V3, that is to generate the length and width of cloaked region R2. Then U randomly generates the vertexes coordinates (H4, H3, V4 and V3) of R2. The client side U calculates , then sends R(H4, H3, V4, V3) and user-specified query POI type t to the server S together.
S: Determines the candidate POI and performs the encryption distance calculation.
After receiving the boundary value of the cloaked region R2 and the queried POI type t, the server S retrieves for all the POIs whose belonging grids within or intersect with candidate rectangle R2, and sorts the POI set that satisfies (POITYPE=t) as the Candidate POI set (Candidate_POI Obviously, is the squared value of distance between POIi Candidate_POI and the query point Q. If , POIi is the POI that U expected to acquire. Thus, U can get the result set:
The time complexity of Protocol 1 is O(n).
B. Protocol 2
In Protocol 1, the POI set returned to U by S is U sorts for the results according to the user-specified query range. However, if the POIINFO of the Candidate_POI is intercepted by a third-party attacker during transmission, user's location and query privacy will expose to the attacker. Moreover, when the user needs higher privacy protection degree, the area of the cloaked region will increase, so as the number of POIs in Candidate_POI. If the server sends all the POIINFO of POIs in Candidate_POI, a lot of redundant information will be introduced during the transmission.
On the basis of Protocol 1, we give another alternative. Using a circular shift encryption method to shift indexes of POI result set calculated in the client side and POI table maintained in the server side, the server S can return all the POI information of the POIs that meet the restriction, without knowing the result POI set.
The client-server interaction flow of Protocol2 is shown in Fig.3 , the detailed steps are as follows:
There are 6 steps in Protocol2, the first 3 steps are essentially the same as the previous steps in the protocol 1, except in step 2: after the server S performs encryption distance calculation, only sends to the user U which gets after decryption and filtering. Then, the server and the client interact again through the following steps to return the POIINFO that satisfies the condition.
Client Server
Boundary of R2, Encrypted query point information, Queried POI type The offset matrix M is used to make the circular shifted encryption for the vector POIINFO, the shifted vector is denoted as POIINFO':
D e t e r m i n e C a n d i d a t e _ P O I according to R2, to p e r f o r m s e c r e t distance calculation P e r for m decryption to o b t a i n t h e result of t h e range search q u e r y f r o m Candidate_POI
The operator "*" represents the Paillier matrix multiplication. Since r is generated randomly, when . Therefore, it is very difficult to get the offset s. Moreover, POIID in set T have been shifted, so S can not get the results calculated in U, and get the corresponding POIINFO' in the result POI set according to the shifted indexes in T. The ith element in vector POIINFO' is denoted as . S sends the set back to U.
U: Decrypts to acquire the POIINFO corresponding to the POI result set.
The indexes that corresponding to the result POIs can be obtained by decrypting the set on the client side.
The time complexity of circular shifted encryption algorithm in Protocol 2 is O(n). In order to better illustrate the interaction progress in Protocol 2, a simple example is given below:
Example: S generates a candidate POI set Candidate_POI according to the boundary of candidate rectangle R2, the encrypted query point location information and the query POI type. Then S sends the candidate POIID and the encrypted distances to U. U filters Candidate_POI to derive POI indexes of the result set:
generates offset vector P (offset s = 3):
encrypts the offset vector:
The set of POI indexes of offset candidate POI set:
The corresponding indexes of result POI in the shifted T:
S generates an offset matrix M according to the received encrypted offset vector:
The server multiplies M with the stored candidate POI set:
According to the shifted Result POIID from U, the number 0, 1 and 4 elements corresponding to POI'INFO are extracted and sent to U. U performs decryption according to the corresponding random number, and finally obtains the corresponding POIINFO of the result set {P1, P2, P3}.
In practice, the two protocols can be combined into an adaptive protocol, according to the data size of the POI information to select different protocol branches, in order to achieve a balance in performance and the privacy protection degree.
CSEP has the following major advantages over existing methods:
• High precision of returned results. As the LBS server calculates the distances from candidate POIs from user's location, the user can filter out POIs for exact results, without distance calculation.
• Location privacy protection. LBS operates on the cyphertext of user's location when calculating distances, and indexes corresponding to POI have been shifted. Thus, CSEP is provable secure.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate CSEP with experimental results, based on real data from a large-scale production LBS. The metrics we considered include result precision, response time and communication overhead.
A. Setup
In the experiment, we have two physical hosts, one as the client and one as the server. The server is con gured with Intel i7 CPU (3.40GHz) and 16GB DDR3 memory, running Windows 8 64bit OS. The client is con gured with Intel i5 CPU (3.1GHz) and 4GB DDR3 memory, also running Windows 8 64bit OS. The length of Paillier's public key is 128 bits; Our test data set was collected from a largescale production LBS (from May to August 2015, containing 3,241,177 entries from more than 2,529,445 users).
B. Precision of results
The standard to measure precision is whether the returned POI set contains all POIs within the query range. Spatial cloaking method [2] [3] [4] [5] uses cloaking region as input to request LBS to get approximate nearest neighbors (approximate NN for short), which cannot guarantee the accuracy of the results. The size of cloaking region in uences the returned approximate nearest results to a large extent. In CSEP, candidate POIs are generated only according to cloak region by the server, just similar with other approximate NN method, so we regard candidate POI results as reference object for the nal results.
We set query range as 500m and vary the area of candidate rectangle R2 from 4 10 4 m 2 to 1 10 5 m 2 , analyze cumulated distribution and calculate the average of distance between user's query point Q and each POI in the results. As shown in Fig. 4 , the average distances between Q and each POI in CSEP results remain 316m as the area of R2 grows according to Fig.  4(a) , all of results are within 500m query range according to Fig.  4(b) . In Fig. 4(a) , average distances between Q and each POI in candidate results increases from 357m to 562m as the area of R2 increases from 4 10 4 m 2 to 1 10 5 m 2 , and distributed broader as shown in Fig. 4(b) . The result generated according to cloak region always contains redundant POIs outside the query range, and the scope of results becomes broader as the cloak region grows. However, the change of cloak region cannot in uence the results of CSEP, since the result set are selected as all POIs within query range in CSEP, which does not contain any omissions and outliers.
C. Response Time
We evaluate the response time of 2 protocols for CSEP in this subsection, and study the correlation between computational overhead and two adjustable variables, the size of candidate rectangle and query range.
The response time for different query ranges is shown in Fig. 5 , where we x the area of rectangle R2 as 4 10 4 m 2 , and vary the query range from 100m to 1000m. Fig. 5(a) shows the comparison of response time on the server side between protocol 1 and protocol 2. As the radius of query range increases from 100m to 1000m, response time of protocol 1 increases from 242ms to 283ms and response time of protocol 2 increases from 268ms to 298ms. On the client side, as shown in Fig. 5(b) , computational overhead of both protocols is less than 10ms, which follows the similar positive correlation between query range and response time. Since more POIs need to be calculated and searched as the size of query range becomes larger.
The response time of different cloak regions R2 is shown in Fig. 6 , where we x the query range as 1000m, and vary the area of R2 from 4 10 4 m 2 to 1 10 5 m 2 . Fig. 6(a) shows the comparison of response time on the server side between Protocol 1 and Protocol 2. As the area of R2 increases from 4 10 4 m 2 to 1 10 5 m 2 , the response time of Protocol 1 increases from 315ms to 643ms and the response time of Protocol 2 increases from 365ms to 812ms. On the client side, as shown in Fig. 6(b) , computational overhead of both protocols is less than 10ms, which follows the same positive correlation between query range and the response time with the server side. Since when cloaked region becomes larger, more POIs are appended into candidate POI set, and more distance calculation operations need to be handled consequently. As another encryption and decryption operation is carried out in Protocol 2, the cost of computing of Protocol 2 is greater than Protocol 1. 
D. Communication Overhead
In this subsection, we evaluate the communication overhead incurred by our two protocols, in terms of bytes transmitted per query. The mainly communication overhead in a query using Protocol 1 consists of in candidate POI set. In Protocol 2, in candidate POI set and the result set selected from the circular shifted matrix POIINFO' compose the communication overhead per query. First, we x the area of rectangle cloaking region as 6 10 4 m 2 , and vary the length of queried range. As shown in Fig.7(a) , that both protocols have a larger communication overhead when the length of queried range increases. Since Protocol 2 do not need to transmit redundant candidate POI information, only need to return encrypted POI information of the result set, the communication cost of Protocol 2 is less than that of Protocol 1. Then, we x the query range as 1000m, and vary the area of cloaked region. Fig.7(b) shows that both protocols have a larger communication overhead when the length of queried range increases, and still Protocol 2 has a smaller bandwidth. Summary: From the experimental results above, we conclude that (1) The results contain all POIs within query range, without any outlier and omission. The computation overhead of the two protocols are in millisecond level on a commodity server, and their communication overhead are around 2 KB, for queried range 1000 m and cloaking size 6 10 4 m 2 . (2) The overhead of both protocols increases for larger queried range and cloaking size, echoing a natural tradeoff between performance and privacy. (3) Since Protocol 2 performs the encryption and decryption for 2 times when filtering the POI information in the result set, the computational cost of Protocol 2 is slightly larger than that of Protocol 1. However, Protocol 2 does not need to transmit redundant POI information during interaction, thus the communication cost of Protocol 2 is less than that of Protocol 2. Moreover, Protocol 2 can provide higher degree of privacy protection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose Circular Shifting Encryption Protocol (CSEP) based on homomorphic encryption and spatial cloaking for location privacy preserving, which can protect the privacy of users' location in the query process under the premise of ensuring the accuracy of results. CSEP can guarantee the accuracy of the results, provide strict privacy protection via encryption method, and also reduce the transmission redundancy with a circular shifting encryption method and improve the privacy protection degree at the same time. Experimental results show that CSEP can provide both privacy protection and the accuracy of results under reasonable computational and communication overheads. In the future, we will further improve the performance and scalability of CSEP to support large-scale user queries.
